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1. Synonyms:  Deception is similar to terms such as manipulation and cheating.  One often 
deceives when cheating and manipulating, although not always.  In particular, 
manipulation may be seen as an active form of deception.   
 
2. Definitions:  Deception is notoriously difficult to define given that there are so many 
forms across human and non-human animals (Mitchell, 1993). Here, we define deception 
as the intentional or unintentional misrepresentation of information.  This 
misrepresentation can be conscious or unconscious and may serve a multitude of 
purposes including (but not limited to):  survival (e.g., physical defense), resource 
acquisition (e.g., acquiring food or resources), or increased inclusive fitness (e.g., 
reproductive advantages).   
 
3. Introduction 
Deception is common in human interactions (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996).  It can be intentional 
such as in the case of lying, self-presentation, or withholding important information.  Deception 
may also be unintentional or unconscious, such as in the case of self-deception (e.g., von Hippel 
& Trivers, 2011).  Deception may stem from good intentions or a desire not to harm, or it may 
come from a place of selfishness or malevolence. 
 
In the animal kingdom, deception is often used for survival. Some researchers have argued that 
survival of primates is calibrated on deception, and that “Machiavellian Intelligence” is required 
for survival (Byrne & Whiten, 1988).  Despite its benefits, deception also poses risk.  To deceive 
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and fail can pose fitness costs in the form of ostracism or death.  To deceive and succeed could 
mean fitness enhancement. 
 
Although a tremendous amount of research and theoretical attention has been paid to the 
evolution of cooperation and reciprocal altruism in modern society (Trivers 1971), players in a 
cooperative society may not merely fit a cooperator vs. cheater distinction.  Instead, some 
deceptive individuals may engage in cooperation for long periods of time in order to cultivate 
trust and the appearance of cooperation.  This cultivation of trust, however, may ultimately be in 
the service of large-scale defection.  In this way, individuals in cooperative societies might be 
better categorized as cooperators and cheaters. 
 
Deception and defection are pervasive in modern society.  At the corporate level, financial fraud 
costs a cooperative society more than 680 billion dollars annually (Wells, 2007).  However, the 
costs of defection are not solely financial.  Individuals suffer severe psychological consequences 
as a result of being victims of fraud or financial misbehavior.  Such consequences include (but 
are not limited to) increased anxiety, depression, and even suicide (Titus & Gover, 2001). 
 
In humans, examples of deceptive strategies can take either long- or short-term forms.  In the 
short-term, individuals may execute strategies which are direct, and are designed to reach broad 
communities, in short intervals of moderate payouts; these individuals are often referred to as 
con-artists or swindlers.  A successful confidence-artist or “con-artist” may prey on a wide 
variety of victims (e.g., elderly women; college students). One example comes from Pratkanis & 
Shadel (2005, pg. 35) where an individual would call and ask elderly individuals to donate 
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money to a fictitious “Say No to Drugs Program.”  He used very broad and flexible persuasion 
techniques and was successful in getting a wide variety of individuals to “donate” to his 
organization. One particularly clever swindle occurred when this con-artist was arrested.  Using 
his phone call from the Federal Marshal’s office (where he was being held), he called one of his 
previous victims claiming that he was a Federal Marshal, and that he could recover all of the 
victim’s losses for a processing fee of $20,000 (Pratkanis & Shadel 2005; pg. 42). 
 
In contrast, some individuals execute strategies designed to reach very specific communities for 
long-term intervals of large payouts.  These individuals are often guilty of anti-trust or 
business/trade violations (Benson & Simpson 2009).  One successful long-term cheater of this 
type is Bernie Madoff.  Most evidence indicates that Madoff first began his fraudulent trading 
back in the early 1970s and eventually was responsible for the largest documented Ponzi scheme 
in history (Arvedlund, 2009). Ponzi Schemes are difficult to perpetuate because one must have 
great patience and build a reputation within the financial community over a significant period of 
time.  Even more difficult, one must show initial returns in order to gain more clients to 
participate in the Ponzi scheme. 
 
Although Madoff’s primary charge was running a Ponzi scheme, he used what is known as 
“affinity fraud” to perpetuate his fraudulent trades (e.g., Babiak & Hare, 2006; Perry & Brody, 
2011).  Affinity fraud occurs when an individual integrates her/himself into a community for the 
purposes of eliciting trust, and then proceeds to defraud that community.  Madoff, however, went 
far beyond general integration into financial communities, serving on many financial advisory 
boards and forming long-standing relationships with important people in governmental positions 
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(Collins, 2011).  Operating for almost 40 years, Madoff was able to defraud investors in excess 
of 65 billion dollars (Arvedlund, 2009).     
 
Although both successful con-artists and white collar offenders (such as Madoff) have cheated 
innocent people out of money, they presented themselves differently. A con-artist, on the one 
hand, can be considered an intentional and direct defector.  Con-artists and short-term deceivers 
use only temporary and superficial deceptive techniques; techniques of which people are 
immediately suspicious (Pratkanis & Shadel, 2005).  On the other hand, Madoff worked himself 
into the fabric of the financial community through more complex deception, giving every 
appearance of cooperation and contribution.  In essence, he imitated or “mimicked” cooperative 
behavior in every facet of his public life. 
 
A comparison of human and non-human animal deception was proposed by Mitchell (1986).  
Mitchell (1993) argued that researchers could learn a lot about human deception by studying 
deception within different kingdoms of living creatures. In particular, Mitchell (1993) walks the 
reader through levels of deception starting with simple camouflage or mimicry all the way up to 
memory and perspective taking. Indeed, these more sophisticated deceptions generally require 
more planning and cognitive ability. 
 
Mitchell further (1996) articulates the process of deception insofar as one must convince a target 
of fictional information without raising issues of suspicion.  Suspicion, according to Mitchell, is 
the enemy of deception. This assertion makes sense, given that the human default in most cases 
is to believe others (Levine, 2014).  In fact, Levine argues that deception sometimes requires 
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self-deception on the part of the deceived.  This finding of course raises the issue of motivation 
(e.g., Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001).  Individuals are most vulnerable to lies when they want to 
believe them in the first place.  Take for example, someone who is uneasy about their savings 
with respect to retirement. This individual meets Madoff and is motivated to believe that the 
solution to their financial woes may be the impressive payouts that Madoff offers. Rather than 
raising red flags about unrealistic returns, the individual is motivated to believe that they are 
simply lucky to have found such a wise financial genius. 
 
4. Differential Temporal Strategies 
 
Jones (2014) argued that all deception falls on a long- to short-term continuum, and there are 
four key components that exist for long-term deception:  complex deception, slow resource 
extraction, community integration, and difficulty in detection.  These four components are absent 
in short-term deceptions. Empirical evidence supports the idea that these four components do 
indeed inter-correlate (Jones & de Roos, 2016).  Below we review further evidence for these 
claims. 
 
Among predators and prey in the animal kingdom, mimicry is an adaptation utilized to confuse 
other organisms to an adaptive end (Wickler, 1968).  In fact, many kingdoms:  viruses/bacteria, 
plants, non-human animals, and humans (both children and adults), are replete with examples of 
some form of mimicry (Damian, 1964; Gilpin, 1975).  Mimicry is especially prevalent when 
deception is adaptive for the organism (Gilpin, 1975). 
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Much in the same way that Madoff displayed characteristics of a cooperator, when in fact, he 
was a cheater, some animals will display characteristics that appear similar to other organisms 
but are actually quite different.  In contrast, con-artists engage in direct parasitic and/or predatory 
behaviors, behaviors that are analogous to traditional infections (Damian, 1964) or predators 
(Gilpin, 1975).   
 
Strategies of fraud resemble viral and bacterial infections of cooperative hosts.  Some infections 
spread quickly in a broad fashion, while others tailor their infection to a specific host; making the 
spread of infection slower, but the virus more difficult to detect (Levin & Bull, 1994).     
 
In the world of microorganisms, virulence is critical in the survival of the microorganism and the 
infection of multiple hosts.  Virulence is the rate of infection of a particular microorganism.  
Virulence, however, comes at a cost:  widespread detection and destruction by antigenic entities 
within the host (Levin & Bull, 1994).  On one end of the virulence spectrum, certain 
microorganisms will infect a broad range of hosts. Examples of such microorganisms are 
Streptococcus pneumonia and Haemophilus influenza.  Such microorganisms are transmitted via 
droplet infection (e.g., sneezing).  The mechanism for infection, among these parasites, is similar 
in most hosts, and these microorganisms infect similar locations within the host (e.g., 
nasopharyngeal passages or respiratory systems).   
 
By contrast, certain forms of meningitis and viral infections, such as the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), have a different approach to infection.  Such infecting agents 
evolve within the host, in order to mimic naturally occurring cells and entities. HIV, for example, 
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is not easily transmitted (i.e., not through droplet) and will often lie undetected for years within a 
host, before causing damage. These differential parasitic strategies can be viewed as two separate 
“defection” strategies utilized by microorganisms in compromising a “cooperative” host 
(Zimmer, 2000).  Thus, it appears, in the evolutionary arms-race between infecting 
microorganisms and multi-cellular hosts that many parasitic organisms have utilized mimicry 
strategies to appear similar to naturally occurring substances within the host’s system (Damian, 
1964). 
 
Mimicry also occurs in the animal kingdom when an animal or species gives the appearance of 
possessing characteristics of an unrelated animal or species, but actually does not possess these 
traits (Holling, 1965).  Common examples can be found in organisms such as butterflies, frogs, 
fish, and lizards (Brodie & Janzen, 1995).  Mimicry, which evolved for the purpose of predator 
confusion and defense, is often referred to as Batesian Mimicry (Malcolm, 1990).  Such creatures 
may display bright coloring or similar markings to creatures that are unpalatable or even 
poisonous.  However, the mimicking organism is either palatable, non-toxic, or both. 
 
Mimicry can work in the other direction as well, in favor of a predator.  Some animals appear to 
be harmless, when in fact they are predatory.  This type of mimicry is referred to as Mertensian 
Mimicry (Wickler, 1968).   For example, the Venus Fly-Trap, which looks quite harmless to 
unsuspecting insects, but is carnivorous, and will strike when an insect is inside (Joel, 1988). 
Another example is the Angler Fish (Wickson & Wynne, 2012).  This fish uses apparatus on its 
head (which looks like food to smaller fish) to lure potential prey close enough for a strike.  
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Mimicry represents an evolutionary arms race in its own right between organisms utilizing 
mimicry and organisms attempting to detect mimicry (Caley & Schluter, 2003). These selective 
pressures and arms-race style evolutionary mechanisms are intensified by the trade-off that exists 
between costs associated with missing opportunities (e.g., the chance to feed on palatable prey) 
vs. the costs associated with making mistakes (e.g., dying from biting into poisonous prey).  In 
other words, the cost/benefit to trusting or avoiding mimics is often based on consequences 
associated with false positives or false negatives.  For example, if the consequence of mistaking 
a palatable fish with an unpalatable fish is merely an unpleasant taste, then there will be mild 
selective pressure placed on predators to distinguish between the two types of fish.  On the other 
hand, if one of the fish carried lethal poison, selective pressures placed on predators for 
distinguishing between the two types of fish would be intense (Caley & Schluter, 2003). 
However, as aforementioned, motivation (and therefore, self-deception) may play a role in 
deception as well.  Take for example a fish that is starving, he/she may be more likely to fall for 
the mimicry-deception, given that the trade-off of poison vs. starving increases risk-taking 
behaviors. 
 
When detecting potential mimicry or deception in humans, differential pressures also produce 
divergent abilities for detection.  For example, when consequences are low and familiarity is 
sparse, humans are not much better than average at detecting deception in other humans (von 
Hippel & Trivers, 2011).  In such situations of little consequence or closeness, most individuals 
lack the motivation and/or ability to detect deception.  This lack of motivation is analogous to the 
lack of selective pressure on predators that face little consequence for mistaking bad tasting fish 
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with palatable ones.   However, when consequences are high (e.g., the individual is high in 
closeness or the event high in consequence); detection of deception is much improved. 
5. Deception and Evolution 
5.1 Frequency Dependent Selection 
The proportion of cheaters vs. cooperators follows the basic principles of frequency-dependent 
selection (Pfenning, et al. 2001).  Frequency dependence means that too much or too little of a 
particular trait, will create an imbalance.  This imbalance is then corrected through selective 
pressures. Several publications have reviewed the impact of frequency-dependent selective 
forces on cheater vs. cooperator strategies (Mealey, 1995; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996).  In 
particular, Mealey (1995) argued that psychopathy was likely to fit in an evolutionary model 
mixed of cheaters and cooperators (p. 526).  Mealey (1995) also noted that other variables (e.g., 
competitive disadvantage) played a role in determining a player’s strategy (in this case, 
disadvantaged individuals were more likely to cheat).    
 
In the case of mimicry, if there ends up being an exceedingly high level of harmless (Batesian) 
mimics when compared to harmful (e.g., poisonous) organisms, it becomes too advantageous for 
predators to take a risk and attack both harmful and harmless organisms, because probability is in 
favor of non-poison. By contrast, if the balance of mimicry to harmful organisms is such that 
there is an exceedingly high percentage of harmful (e.g., poisonous) organisms, then selective 
pressure would favor (a) finding an alternative source of food (i.e., predators would avoid both 
mimics and harmful prey altogether), (b) evolve stronger mechanisms for differentiating mimics 
from non-mimics (Caley & Schluter, 2003). In this way, a positive imbalance of cheaters might 
pave the way for mimics.   
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Among humans, some who mimic cooperation with selfish intentions may never defect unless 
they feel it is “necessary” (Machiavelli 1513/1981, p. 69).  However, until necessity strikes, the 
most effective cheaters may maintain their cooperative veneer, and thus, a positive reputation.  It 
should be noted that necessity may be perceived differently by different individuals.  
 
5.2 Single vs. dual selective pressures on mimic-cheaters 
 
Frequency dependent selections also are context specific.  In areas familiar to a particular type of 
dangerous predator or unpalatable prey, mimicry is quite effective (Pfenning et al. 2001).  In 
such cases, predators and prey require highly evolved mechanisms to detect differences and 
mimicry will often work.  In areas unfamiliar to these organisms, mimicry is unnecessary.  For 
example, Pfenning and colleagues (2001) placed Corral Snake look-alikes in eastern regions of 
the United States, as well as regions of Central America.  They found that snake predators in the 
United States would readily attack these Corral Snake look-alikes because they had no prior 
exposure to such snakes or to their mimics.  By contrast, Corral Snake look-alikes placed in 
regions of Central America were left alone.    
 
By analogy, detection of deception in humans may operate in a similar fashion.  For example, 
individuals planning affinity fraud are more likely to go undetected in certain environments once 
introduced (e.g., religious communities) as compared to other environments (e.g., Wall Street). 
Communities used to dealing in fast-paced monetary exchanges (e.g., Wall Street) are more 
likely to be flooded with deceptive attempts. Thus, within these communities, there is likely to be 
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greater selective pressure placed on deceptive individuals to emulate both being a cooperator, 
and simultaneously avoid looking like a cheater. Less pressure may be placed on someone in a 
community where deception is not expected (e.g., religious community). 
 
6. Differentiating human deception strategies 
Indeed, research and theory in evolutionary models of cooperation have alluded to several 
permutations of cooperation that might differentially benefit the individual at the (slight) cost to 
the group.  For example, Trivers (1971) noted that appearing to be a good cooperator with mild 
levels of selfish bias, provides long-term benefits of resource allocation without incurring direct 
cheating costs.  However, it should be noted that such strategies require social dominance to 
execute.  When caught taking slightly more than one is supposed to take, it would require either 
refined social skills (Hawley, 1999), status (Bear & Rys, 1994), or intimidation (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990a) to avoid having group members act in punitive ways based on unfairness.  
Moreover, as Axelrod (1984) points out, strategies are contextually based, and one might cheat 
when costs are low, others are submissive, detection is unlikely, payoffs are great, or one feels 
cheated in their own right.  As aforementioned, frequency dependence and the presence of 
others’ strategies greatly influence the strategy employed by a given group member (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990a).   
 
However, there is a second way an individual may engage in deception is through self-deception. 
For example, von Hippel and Trivers (2011) reviewed a body of evidence suggesting self-
deceptive enhancement bestows advantages with respect to interpersonal deception. They argue 
that through deceiving oneself, detection of deception by others is rendered extraordinarily 
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difficult. The absence of truthful leaks and/or hints of deception stem from the fact that self-
deceptive individuals genuinely believe that they are cooperators, they benefit others, and they 
are not cheating.  In sum, mimicry may be split into two forms:  Mimicry stemming from 
intentional and planful strategy vs. mimicry stemming from self-deception and exaggerated 
overconfidence.    
 
Self-deceptive enhancement is a fairly broad strategy that can be beneficial (at least in the short-
term).  It should be noted, however, that exaggerations come at a cost.  At best, these self-
deceptive exaggerations represent a “mixed blessing” (Paulhus, 1998), because they wear off 
over time.  
 
Personality and Deception: The Dark Triad 
 
The Dark Triad is a term that refers to three commonly studied personality traits in the realm of 
interpersonal harm (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). All three of these traits are linked to deception 
under different circumstances (Jones & Paulhus, 2016). Machiavellianism is associated with 
strategic and planful deception (Jones & Paulhus, 2009). Such individuals are cautious and 
anticipate future moves from others (Bereczkei et al., 2013).  In contrast, psychopathy is purely 
short-term and aggressive in their deception, wearing a temporary mask of deception (Book et 
al., 2015). Finally, narcissistic individuals deceive through self-deception (Paulhus, Harms, 
Bruce, & Lysy, 2003). In this way, the Dark Triad traits cover a wide array of deceptive 
dispositions. 
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It should be noted that all deception requires some level of skill.  Individuals who are convincing 
“talkers” often rise in corporate ranks with little substance (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010).  
Skill is likely to be even more necessary for deceptions that are long-term or planned.  Turner 
and Martinez (1977) found that individuals high in Machiavellianism but low in intelligence 
were the least successful individuals. In contrast, those high in Machiavellianism and high in 




Deceptions can take predatory and defensive forms. Further, deception ranges from simple (e.g., 
camouflage) to complicated (e.g., planned).  In many ways, mimicry can be split into more 
nuanced categories, which suggests that there may be multiple forms of mimicry operating in 
humans as well as non-human animals.  Moreover, there is a wide-variety of deceptive tactics: 
Some are likely to be perpetuated by planful mimic-cheaters, such as intentional information 
omission (DeScioli, Christner, & Kurzban, 2011).  By contrast, other tactics are simple and 
direct lies based on emotional manipulation (Patrick & Zempolich, 1998) or fabrication (ten 
Brinke, MacDonald, Porter, & O’Conner, 2012).  Still others involve overconfidence (Campbell, 
Goodie, & Foster, 2004), and entitlement (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 
2004).  Simply put, understanding human deception is complicated because there are infinite 
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